According to latitudinarianism, S’s belief that x is F is about x solely in virtue of S’s believing a proposition that ascribes F-ness to x.
Saul Kripke (2011d) has recently objected to this view by arguing that it entails that S believes of arbitrary objects that they are F.
In this paper I revisit Ernest Sosa’s (1995a,b) notion of associative aboutness to put forward a novel account of mental reference, called “associative exportation”,
that evades the troublesome consequence pointed out by Kripke, while preserving the spirit of latitudinarianism. In particular, the proposed view:
(1) does not invoke any form of acquaintance with the object of belief; (2) validates a weak reducibility thesis of de re belief to de dicto;
(3) is compatible with the observation that our unreflective aboutness judgments are latitudinarian; (4) has the resources to attenuate the worries about the notorious tallest-spy objection.
keywords: belief reports, de re/de dicto, mental reference, latitudinarianism, exportation
Recent critics of Grice’s Modified Occam’s Razor, “Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity”, focused excessively on
“necessity” and insufficiently on “senses.” In this paper I defend a version of the principle, according to which “Distinct senses
(homonyms) are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.” Furthermore, I put forward the hypothesis that this is actually the intended reading of Grice’s razor.
keywords: Grice, polysemy, homonymy, ambiguity