• A paper on social epistemology. (with Shannon Brick) (Under review)

  • A paper on desire reports. (Under review)

  • A paper on truthmakers. (Under review)

  • Associative exportation.

  • According to latitudinarianism, S’s belief that x is F is about x solely in virtue of S’s believing a proposition that ascribes F-ness to x. Saul Kripke (2011d) has recently objected to this view by arguing that it entails that S believes of arbitrary objects that they are F. In this paper I revisit Ernest Sosa’s (1995a,b) notion of associative aboutness to put forward a novel account of mental reference, called “associative exportation”, that evades the troublesome consequence pointed out by Kripke, while preserving the spirit of latitudinarianism. In particular, the proposed view: (1) does not invoke any form of acquaintance with the object of belief; (2) validates a weak reducibility thesis of de re belief to de dicto; (3) is compatible with the observation that our unreflective aboutness judgments are latitudinarian; (4) has the resources to attenuate the worries about the notorious tallest-spy objection.
    keywords: belief reports, de re/de dicto, mental reference, latitudinarianism, exportation
  • Homonymy is not to be multiplied beyond necessity.

  • Recent critics of Grice’s Modified Occam’s Razor, “Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity”, focused excessively on “necessity” and insufficiently on “senses.” In this paper I defend a version of the principle, according to which “Distinct senses (homonyms) are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.” Furthermore, I put forward the hypothesis that this is actually the intended reading of Grice’s razor.
    keywords: Grice, polysemy, homonymy, ambiguity


  • Sophisticated textualism and sanctions. Studia Iuridica 2019 82: 343-357.

  • Against ‘the input view’ of legal gaps. Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej 2019 2(20): 75-88.

  • Objective and epistemic gradability: is the New Angle on the Knobe Effect empirically grounded? (with Bartosz Maćkiewicz), Philosophical Psychology 2019 32(2): 234-256.

  • Can a consequentialist be a good friend? Etyka 2016 52: 56-79.